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The Economic Implications of House Price Capitalization:  
A Synthesis 
 
 
Abstract 
In this article I argue that the extent to which fiscal variables are capitalized into house 
prices has important economic implications. I synthesize an emerging literature that explores 
the conditions under which public and private investments and intergovernmental transfers 
are capitalized into local house prices and the broader implications of such capitalization. The 
main insights are: (i) House price capitalization is more pronounced in locations with strict 
regulatory and geographical supply constraints; (ii) capitalization can – under certain 
conditions – induce the provision of durable local public goods and club goods; and (iii) 
capitalization effects – which are habitually ignored by policy makers – have important 
adverse consequences for a wide range of policies such as intergovernmental aid or the 
mortgage interest deduction.  
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1  Introduction 
Municipalities and neighborhoods differ enormously in their levels of local public good 
provision, accumulation of social capital or private investments in the housing stock. Some 
localities – often suburbs that surround large and prosperous cities – have excellent public 
schools and other public services, as well as close ties among helpful neighbors. These places 
are typically also exceptionally well maintained.  Other locations, however, are confronted 
with appalling public services, non-existing or dysfunctional social networks and decay. Inner 
city neighborhoods in less prosperous cities or more rural locations are often hampered by 
some or all of these problems. 
One potential explanation for these stark differences in local public and private 
investments is that they are fundamentally caused by local differences in natural amenities 
(e.g., scenic views or access to nice public parks) and resulting sorting by income. If 
households appreciate natural amenities, they will bid up house prices (and rents) in locations 
with more desirable characteristics. And since the most affluent households can afford to live 
– and own – in the highest-amenity locations, holding other things constant, the outcome of 
the sorting process will likely be that the wealthiest households own the houses in the highest 
amenity places. The presence of affluent homeowners in turn will likely generate positive 
externalities (including fiscal externalities and peer effects), ultimately resulting in better local 
public services (including schools with better outcomes), stronger social ties, and – since 
affluent residents are more likely to own their home – better maintained housing in places that 
are otherwise more desirable as well.  
Yet public good- and club good-provision is not always superior in locations with nice 
natural amenities or put differently: often places with excellent public good- or club good-
provision are not very exceptional in terms of their natural amenities. Various other factors, 
besides natural amenities and income-sorting (e.g., heterogeneous preferences for local public 
services, social attributes, and proximity to the work place; relocation costs) matter as well. 
This paper explores one particular mechanism that may cause local public and private 
investments to vary significantly across places, independent of the fundamental desirability of 
these places: Locations may differ in the extent to which fiscal variables – local public 
services and taxes – are capitalized into house prices, for example because of spatial 
differences in local housing supply constraints that determine the local housing supply price 
elasticity. Differential capitalization effects in turn may provide varying incentives to local 
property owners (homeowners and landlords) to (i) vote in favor of or lobby for investments 
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in their communities and neighborhoods and (ii) carry out private investments that exert 
positive externalities (e.g., private contributions to local social capital, creation of scenic 
gardens or maintenance of the housing stock).  
Another characteristic of house price capitalization is that it can cause significant 
redistribution. For example, federal or central government grants or inter-jurisdictional 
transfers that aim to help disadvantaged households may have perverse effects in that they 
help well-off property owners (including absentee landlords) rather than deprived renters. 
These redistribution effects are ‘hidden’ and quite likely not intended by policy makers. 
Finally, house price capitalization may not only have adverse redistribution effects but 
may also offset the intended incentive effects of certain policies. For example, the mortgage 
interest deduction (MID) aims to improve homeownership attainment. However, to the extent 
that the MID generates greater demand for owner-occupied housing it may also increase 
house prices, potentially offsetting the policy induced incentives to own homes. In fact, to the 
extent that future MID benefits are capitalized into higher house prices, the MID may 
decrease the likelihood that down-payment constrained potential house-buyers may qualify 
for a mortgage. Similarly, MID-induced higher house prices may increase housing related 
transaction costs as these are typically proportional to house prices. This in turn reduces the 
incentives of mobile – often young – households to own. Hence, the net effect of the MID on 
homeownership may, for some groups, be negative in places with substantial capitalization. 
The aim of this paper is to review and synthesize the existing research that explores the 
incentive and redistribution effects and unintended consequences of house price 
capitalization. This research ties into two well-established strands of the literature; (i) on the 
role of capitalization for local public sector efficiency and (ii) on the empirical evidence of the 
capitalization of local public goods and taxes into house prices. It also ties into a more recent 
strand of the literature on the ‘New Economics of Equilibrium Sorting’ and resulting 
possibilities for policy analysis. I briefly review these three related strands of the literature in 
the next section. Section 3 explores under what conditions fiscal variables and other local 
attributes – such as social capital – are capitalized into property prices. In particular, I discuss 
the role of the demand price elasticity and of local supply constraints, which can be of a 
regulatory or geographical (physical) nature. Section 4 examines the incentive effects of 
capitalization for the provision of local public goods and club goods. In particular, I 
investigate the role of homeownership, transaction costs and the corresponding expected 
duration in the property. Section 5 discusses the distributional consequences of house price 
capitalization – the ‘hidden’ redistribution effects and other unintended consequences. The 
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last section concludes and briefly discusses possible future directions in what I think is a 
fertile area of research. 
 
2 Related literature 
2.1 The roots of the capitalization literature: Capitalization and efficiency 
The point of departure for the theoretical considerations is the proposition most 
prominently expressed by Musgrave (1939) and Samuelson (1954) that there is no viable 
market mechanism that reveals individual preferences and ensures the optimal provision of 
public goods. Individuals may always have an incentive to free-ride on other individuals’ 
contributions to public goods, necessitating a political solution to overcome market failure. 
Yet, as Tiebout (1956) pointed out, this pessimistic view may not apply in the case of local 
public goods. Tiebout proposed that consumer mobility and inter-jurisdictional competition, 
at least under restrictive assumptions1, may generate an efficient provision of local public 
services. This proposition has subsequently become known as the ‘Tiebout-hypothesis’. 
Whereas Tiebout did not consider the role of the land market and capitalization effects in 
his theoretical analysis, in another seminal paper, Oates (1969) suggested that if residents 
indeed ‘vote with their feet’ for local public goods, as argued by Tiebout, then fiscal 
differentials among communities should be capitalized into house prices. This proposition has 
later been labeled the ‘capitalization-hypothesis’. Using a sample of New Jersey 
municipalities, Oates did indeed find evidence suggesting that fiscal differentials are 
capitalized to a large extent into house prices. That is, all else equal, property taxes reduce 
house prices; expenditures on local public schools have the opposite effect. Oates originally 
interpreted this finding as evidence in favor of the ‘Tiebout-hypothesis’.  
Oates’ (1969) study induced a voluminous theoretical literature that by and large rejected 
his proposition that capitalization provides a test of the Tiebout-hypothesis. Instead the 
literature reached consensus on three points: (i) fiscal differentials can be expected to be 
capitalized into house prices, (ii) existence of capitalization is consistent with foot-voting, and 
(iii) this does not necessarily imply efficiency of local public good provision. Chaudry-Shah 
(1988) and Ross and Yinger (1999) provide comprehensive surveys summarizing the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literatures surrounding this debate.  
                                                 
1  The restrictive assumptions are: costless mobility, perfect knowledge of fiscal packages in all 
municipalities, a large number of competing local jurisdictions, endogenous community size, no external 
economies or diseconomies, no multidimensional preferences, no spillover losses of local public good provision 
to surrounding jurisdictions, no land or labor market, and no commercial real estate. See Tiebout (1956) for 
details and the survey by Chaudry-Shah (1988) for an interpretation of the assumptions and their implications. 
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A few studies that followed up on Oates (1969) are particularly noteworthy as they have 
important implications for empirical research. In a series of articles Brueckner (1979, 1982 
and 1983) developed a bid-rent model framework of property value determination, which 
considers a world that is not in perfect Tiebout-equilibrium. In Brueckner’s framework, a 
local government finances the provision of local public services from a local property tax, 
with the objective of maximizing the value of its housing stock. Households with 
homogeneous tastes but heterogeneous incomes are freely mobile between locations, so that 
they bid for units until the utility from dwelling is the same everywhere. As a consequence, 
both the households’ marginal willingness to pay for local public services and the local 
property tax are fully capitalized into house prices. The local government should set the level 
of public expenditures such that the capitalized tax needed to finance a further rise in services 
would just offset the capitalized willingness to pay for them. When this condition is met, the 
public expenditure level is efficient in that it satisfies the Samuelson condition: at the margin, 
the aggregate willingness to pay for additional services equals the cost of providing them.  
Suppose now that for some reason spending on public services is below the level where it 
maximizes the value of the aggregate housing stock. This could be because of institutional 
constraints (e.g., property tax limits) or simply because local public policy is the outcome of a 
political process in which many conflicting interests interact. By implication, the capitalized 
willingness to pay for an increase in expenditure would exceed the capitalized tax needed to 
pay for it and, hence, an increase in expenditure would capitalize ‘more than fully’ into house 
prices. Conversely, overspending on local public services would lead to less than full 
capitalization. This reasoning can be illustrated graphically: aggregate property values of a 
local jurisdiction are an inverted U-shaped function of the level of public good provision.  
Taking this theoretical model to the data, in an empirical equation that omits local taxes, a 
positive coefficient on local public spending can be interpreted as under-provision of local 
public services, while a negative coefficient can be interpreted as over-provision. A 
coefficient that is not statistically different from zero implies optimal local public good 
provision. See Brueckner (1979 and 1982) for early empirical applications and Bradbury et al. 
(2001) and Hilber and Mayer (2009) for more refined empirical analyses in the same spirit.2  
                                                 
2 Bradbury et al. (2001) provide evidence for underspending on education in a sample of Massachusetts 
municipalities that were constrained by the property tax limit ‘Proposition 2½’. The authors speculate that 
underspending on education was not only related to institutional constraints, but also to a conflict of interests 
between households with and without children. In this context, Hilber and Mayer (2009) document that whereas 
the median homebuyer outside of central cities in the US has school-aged children, the median voter does not. 
Hence, house prices, which are determined by the marginal homebuyer, may reflect a strong preference for 
spending on education, from which the median voter derives few or no direct benefits. To the extent that the 
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In a similar vein, within the Brueckner framework, full capitalization of any ‘windfall 
gain’ at the local level – for example state educational aid in the US or central government 
grants in the UK – implies an efficient level of local public spending (see Barrow and Rouse 
2004 and Hilber et al. 2011).  
However, Brueckner’s framework builds on a number of restrictive assumptions, perhaps 
most importantly; costless mobility, homogeneity of tastes and perfect substitutability of 
locations. If places are inherently different and households vary in their appreciation for these 
differences and/or in their relocation costs, the demand curve for living in a certain place 
becomes downward sloping (see Arnott and Stiglitz, 1979, for an early discussion of this 
argument; Section 3.2 examines it in more detail). The proposition of a downward sloping 
local demand curve has important implications for the provision of local public services: For 
example, spending on services for the elderly can be expected to capitalize less strongly than 
spending on education. This is because in most places an elderly household is less likely than 
a household with young children to be a ‘marginal homebuyer’. (The reverse argument of 
course applies to retirement communities in states such as Florida or Arizona.) Furthermore, 
downward sloping demand introduces a role for supply conditions: capitalization can be 
expected to be stronger in places where housing supply is less elastic, either because of 
limited availability of developable land (geographical supply constraints) or because of 
regulatory constraints on new residential development (I discuss this point in Section 3.3).  
Another stringent assumption in the Brueckner framework is that additional spending is 
not ‘wasted’. Yet, additional resources may not only be used to provide more and/or better 
public services but may be devoted to economic rents, e.g., by increasing the salaries of 
existing public sector workers or by granting additional perks, leading not only to Pareto-
inefficient but also X-inefficient provision of public services (see e.g. Wykoff 1990). To the 
extent that additional spending is wasted, all else equal, it does not increase the desirability of 
a location, will not increase housing demand and will therefore leave house prices unaffected. 
Of course, all else may not be equal: to the extent that local spending is funded by local taxes 
rather than federal or central government grants (which – from the perspective of local 
jurisdictions – can be interpreted as ‘windfall gains’), the fiscal differential can be expected to 
be negatively capitalized. 
                                                                                                                                                        
median voter puts more weight on the tax required for educational spending than on the capitalization of good 
schools into property values, the political process may yield underprovision of educational services from the 
perspective of the marginal homebuyer. 
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In conclusion, one ought to be very cautious in inferring normative claims (under- or 
over-provision of local public services) from an empirical analysis of capitalization. In an 
empirical specification that omits local taxes, a zero coefficient on local public services, may 
not be interpreted as a Pareto-efficient outcome. In a similar vein, full capitalization of 
federal, state or central government grants into local house prices, all else equal, may not 
necessarily imply allocative- and/or cost-efficiency. This is because full capitalization could 
be a combination of various opposing effects. For instance, heterogeneity in tastes for 
education could lead to underspending from the perspective of the marginal homebuyer 
(implying more than full capitalization) and at the same time, some of the aid or grants could 
be wasted on bureaucracy (implying less than full capitalization), so that on balance full 
capitalization could not be rejected empirically. Generally, in settings where (i) locations are 
not perfect substitutes, (ii) relocation costs are quite high and vary between different types of 
households3, (iii) households are heterogeneous in many respects other than their income, and 
(iv) housing supply price elasticities vary across locations, the extent of capitalization of fiscal 
variables into local house prices may contain little information content that would permit 
making an efficiency claim (see also Ross and Yinger 1999 and Hilber et al. 2011).  
Another important theoretical question, which has implications for empirical work, is 
whether house price capitalization is a characteristic of long-run equilibrium. Building on 
Brueckner’s framework but also integrating a voting process, Yinger (1982) suggests that 
capitalization can persist in long-run equilibrium and is not eliminated by supply responses. 
He concludes that efficient outcomes depend on local residents voting for the efficient level of 
services; foot-voting alone does not guarantee efficient levels of public goods. 
In a similar vein, a number of theoretical papers explored whether capitalization can 
persist in Tiebout-equilibrium. Edel and Sclar (1974), Hamilton (1976a) and Epple et al. 
(1978), among others, proposed that in a world with completely elastic supply of local 
communities, public sector variables should be uncorrelated with house prices in full Tiebout-
equilibrium. Hence, capitalization should be interpreted as a disequilibrium phenomenon that 
will disappear in the long-run. On the other hand Epple and Zelenitz (1981) demonstrated that 
capitalization can exist in equilibrium if community boundaries are fixed exogenously, a 
reasonable assumption, at least in the short and medium run.  
                                                 
3 Relocation costs are particularly high for homeowners but also for households in public rental housing. 
Public housing is not very relevant in the US but in many countries a large share of the housing stock is public 
(e.g., in Holland or Scotland). 
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Since the theoretical literature on house price capitalization is ambiguous about whether 
(full) capitalization of fiscal variables into house prices should persist in long-run equilibrium, 
I turn next to the empirical work.  
 
2.2 Evidence on the extent of capitalization of fiscal variables and amenities 
On the empirical side, numerous studies followed up on Oates (1969) and suggested 
improvements.4 The vast majority of the earlier studies explore the capitalization of fiscal 
variables – mainly local expenditures on public schools and property taxes – into house prices 
and find substantial if not full capitalization (e.g., Oates 1969 and 1973; King 1977; Stull and 
Stull 1991; Man and Bell 1996). Reinhard (1981) even finds evidence of overcapitalization.5 
Only a few studies, notably, Pollakowsky (1973), Wales and Wiens (1974), Follain and 
Malpezzi (1981) or McMillan and Carlson (1977) do not find any evidence of capitalization. 
The last study is particularly noteworthy because it estimates capitalization effects in small 
towns in rural Wisconsin. One proposition – further explored in Section 3.2 – is that the no-
capitalization finding may be due to fairly elastic long-run housing supply in rural places. 
Over the last few decades various methodological advances lead to more reliable 
estimates of capitalization effects. One important innovation has been the introduction of the 
‘boundary discontinuity’ (BD) approach, first applied by Cushing (1984) to study the 
capitalization of interjurisdictional fiscal differentials into house price differentials between 
adjacent blocks at the border of two jurisdictions. Cushing finds roughly full capitalization of 
tax rates as well as significant capitalization of education and library services. Subsequent, 
more refined, BD studies focus on the capitalization of school quality (e.g., Black 1999; 
Gibbons and Machin 2003 and 2006; Davidoff and Leigh 2008; Fack and Grenet 2010; 
Gibbons et al. 2013; Gibbons and Machin 2008 provide a comprehensive survey). Whereas 
all these studies find statistically significant effects, quantitative effects vary significantly: A 
one standard deviation increase in school quality raises house prices by between 2 and 10%.6 
                                                 
4 Chaudry-Shah (1988), Dowding and Biggs (1994) or Ross and Yinger (1999) provide comprehensive 
reviews of the earlier literature. 
5 Under the assumption of a discount rate of 5% and a time horizon of 40 years the implied rates of 
capitalization of the local property tax are as follows: Oates (1969): 67%; Oates (1973): 93%; King (1977): 67%; 
Man and Bell (1996): 90%; Reinhard (1981): 145%. Stull and Stull (1991) assumed a discount rate of 10% and 
an infinite time horizon to compute a capitalization rate of the property tax of 75%. Numerous studied explored 
capitalization rates of other types of taxes. Man and Bell (1996) concluded that the extent of capitalization of the 
sales tax was relatively low with 18%. The findings of Stull and Stull (1991) imply a rate of capitalization of the 
US income tax, from the viewpoint of a median income household, of 75%. Basten et al. (2014), focusing on 
income taxes in Switzerland, demonstrate that about a third of the capitalization effect of income taxes can be 
traced back to sorting of high-income households into low-tax municipalities. 
6 See Davidoff and Leigh (2008, Table 1) for a more extensive comparison and discussion of these studies. 
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A few studies use variation induced by ‘natural experiments’. For example, Bogart and 
Cromwell (2000) exploit school-redistricting, employing a difference-in-difference estimator. 
Reback (2005) examines the adoption of an inter-district school choice program to identify 
the capitalization effects associated with the diminished relevance of school district 
boundaries. Kane et al. (2006), finally, exploit variation in school boundaries caused by a 
court-imposed desegregation order. The estimates of the latter two studies suggest comparable 
quantitative magnitudes to the BD studies: a one standard deviation increase in school quality 
raises house prices by 3.8 to 7.7% and by 10%, respectively. 
Various other studies use alternative methodological approaches to examine whether 
local taxes or public services are capitalized into house prices. They too, by and large, reach 
the conclusion that fiscal variables impact house prices. For example, Brasington and Haurin 
(2006) employ spatial statistical tools to identify the effect of school quality on house prices. 
Their findings suggest that a one standard-deviation increase in school quality raises house 
prices by 7.6%. Clapp et al. (2008) use panel data and control for neighborhood 
unobservables to explore the effect of long-run changes in school quality and property taxes 
on house prices. Interestingly, their estimates of property tax capitalization increase 
significantly when they consider long-run changes. Palmon and Smith (1998a) focus on the 
spurious correlation problem between public services and taxes. Using unique data that varies 
in taxes but not in public services and thereby avoids the spurious correlation problem, they 
find full capitalization. Palmon and Smith (1998b), finally, address the under-identification 
problem by using estimates of rental values instead of net user cost. Their findings also imply 
capitalization rates indistinguishable from full capitalization.  
While identifying causal effects of fiscal variables on house prices has been the focus of 
earlier studies that employed a two-stage-least-squares (TSLS) technique, there have been 
advances in finding more plausibly exogenous instruments that arguably do not directly 
impact house prices (i.e., valid ‘excluded instruments’ from a theoretical point of view) and 
are not weakly correlated with the endogenous fiscal variables. For example, Rosenthal 
(2003) utilizes the random assignment of school inspections in England as an exogenous 
source of variation. He finds a price elasticity of school exam performance of 5%. 
A number of studies focus on the question whether it is school inputs (expenditures) or 
school outputs (typically proxied by test scores) that are capitalized into house prices. For 
example, Downes and Zabel (2002) combine panel data techniques with the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to identify the causal effect of reading test scores on house prices. 
Their estimates suggest that school outputs rather than inputs are capitalized. On the other 
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hand Bradbury et al. (2001) and Hilber and Mayer (2009) use a property tax limit as an 
exogenous source of variation to identify changes in school spending. Controlling for school 
test scores, they find that communities that were constrained by the property tax limit realized 
gains in property values to the degree that they were able to increase school spending despite 
the limitation, suggesting that at least in these constrained locations the marginal homebuyer 
valued additional spending on schools.  
A related question is whether the effect of school quality on house prices is linear, as is 
assumed in most capitalization studies. Cheshire and Sheppard (2004), using data for the UK, 
document that better school quality only commands a substantial price premium in the top 
third of the quality distribution. Chiodo et al. (2010) explicitly test the non-linearity between 
school quality and house prices in a US context and confirm its importance, concluding that 
the relationship between school quality and house prices in the BD framework would be 
better characterized as a non-linear relationship. 
A few studies focus on fiscal transfers across jurisdictions (both, of a horizontal and 
vertical nature). Barrow and Rouse (2004) estimate the effect of state education aid in the US 
on residential property prices within the Brueckner (1979, 1982 and 1983) framework 
outlined in Section 2.1. In such a restrictive setting a full capitalization finding (i.e., a $1 
increase in state education aid generates a properly discounted $1 increase in property values) 
may be interpreted as evidence that school districts spend their money efficiently. Their 
results provide no evidence of massive overspending by school districts, that is, potential 
residents appear to value education expenditure. In a similar vein, Hilber et al. (2011) explore 
the impact of central government grants on local house prices in England. Using panel data 
and an exogenous source of variation in grants to identify the causal effect on house prices, 
their results indicate substantial to full capitalization. Interestingly, they find that house prices 
respond more strongly in locations in which new construction is constrained by physical 
barriers. The latter result suggests that long-run supply constraints may affect the extent of 
capitalization; a proposition that is explored in more depth in Section 3.2. 
Finally, a few recent empirical studies advanced knowledge by focusing on the 
determinants of the extent of house price capitalization. For example, Figlio and Lucas (2004) 
demonstrate that the likely capitalization effect is greater the more information on school 
quality is available, suggesting that the degree of information-availability may affect the 
extent of capitalization. Hilber and Mayer (2009) establish, using a first-difference IV 
specification, that municipalities with less available land for new construction have a lower 
supply-price elasticity and a greater extent of capitalization of various demand factors, 
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including instrumented school spending. Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) estimate a lower 
hedonic price of school quality in areas with more construction. They conclude that their 
finding is due to rational discounting of current school quality in areas with plenty of new 
housing supply as a result of greater risk that the quality may not persist in the longer-run.  
 
2.3 The ‘New Economics of Equilibrium Sorting’ 
While the ‘traditional’ capitalization literature, discussed above, has been focusing on 
local public sector efficiency and empirical evidence of capitalization effects, more recently, 
advances in economic models of the household sorting process have led to a new framework 
– the ‘New Economics of Equilibrium Sorting’ (Kuminoff et al. 2013) – that has close links 
to the literature discussed above but has a rather different focus and intellectual foundation: 
Although sorting models are largely based on the idea of Tiebout sorting, the theoretical 
framework crucially builds on the intellectual foundations of the literature on hedonic and 
discrete-choice models of differentiated product markets. The foundations can be traced back 
to the seminal contributions by Rosen (1974) on hedonic prices and implicit markets and by 
McFadden (1974) on discrete choice modelling.  
In a nutshell; equilibrium sorting models (ESMs) combine the information provided by 
an equilibrium hedonic price function (Rosen 1974) with a formal description of the choice 
process that underlies market sorting of heterogeneous agents (McFadden 1974). Two types 
of sorting models can be distinguished. Vertical sorting models (e.g. Epple and Sieg 1999) 
summarize differences in choices by a single index (e.g., neighborhood quality) that everyone 
agrees on. In these models, agents may have heterogeneous preferences for neighborhood 
quality versus other types of consumption. In contrast, horizontal models (e.g., Bayer et al. 
2007) allow for heterogeneity across individuals in preferences for specific neighborhood 
attributes.7 The basic idea of all these models is to use information on sorting decisions of 
heterogeneous agents to infer behavioral parameters. These parameters are then typically used 
to (i) infer welfare effects of a (large) policy change and (ii) predict behavior in response to a 
(large) policy change. The framework can be used to evaluate past policies but it is 
particularly useful to evaluate prospective policy analysis. The ESM-framework has been 
applied to various types of public goods and services, amenities, externalities, or housing 
policy reforms. Examples include the quality of public education (e.g., Bayer et al. 2007; 
Kuminoff and Pope 2014), air quality (e.g., Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; Tra 2010), congestion 
                                                 
7 For example, consider one household that values good schools and another one values clean air. Both 
households may end up in the same neighborhood. While horizontal models are arguably more realistic, one 
caveat is that they frequently rely on an “idiosyncratic taste” shock to facilitate estimation (Timmins 2014). 
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(e.g., Murdock and Timmins 2007), or mortgage interest deduction reforms (Binner and Day 
2015). Kuminoff et al. (2013) provide an excellent and comprehensive review of the state of 
knowledge in this literature, the possibilities for policy analysis, and the conceptual 
challenges that define the frontiers of this literature.  
Particularly relevant for this synthesis article, Kuminoff and Pope (2014) discuss factors 
other than the supply price elasticity – highlighted in this synthesis article – that can drive a 
wedge between capitalization effects (i.e., changes in house prices as a response to exogenous 
shocks to e.g. local public goods, amenities, or externalities) and the public’s willingness-to-
pay. Kuminoff and Pope demonstrate that in a setting with trading between heterogeneous 
buyers and sellers in a market, capitalization effects can in some cases have a welfare 
interpretation comparable to that of Rosen’s (1974) hedonic model (which assumes perfectly 
elastic local housing demand and thus implies ‘full capitalization’). In other cases, however, it 
is unclear how to interpret capitalization effects, even if one is willing to accept the 
assumption that local housing demand is perfectly elastic and the supply price elasticity thus 
does not affect the extent of capitalization. This is due to the economic implications of some 
of the assumptions maintained in the hedonic model. One crucial assumption is that the 
gradient of the hedonic price function is constant over time. This assumption is questionable 
since even small changes in one amenity can trigger tipping effects via Tiebout sorting that 
can produce large changes in other features of equilibria (e.g., Sethi and Somanathan 2004). 
As Kuminoff and Pope (2014) demonstrate, using boundary discontinuity designs and 
focusing on school quality, capitalization effects may understate parents’ willingness to pay 
for public school improvements by as much as 75 percent. It is worth emphasizing however 
that regardless of the welfare interpretation of capitalization effects, accurate measurement of 
these effects has inherent value since these effects matter to homeowners, renters, and 
beneficiaries of programs funded by property tax revenue (Kuminoff et al. 2013). 
 
3 Housing demand price elasticity, local supply constraints  
 and the extent of house price capitalization 
3.1 Why does it matter whether fiscal variables are capitalized? 
In the early capitalization literature that followed Oates (1969), house price capitalization 
was thought to be a means of testing for efficiency in the local public sector: either in a more 
narrow sense – testing the Tiebout hypothesis – or in a broader sense – testing whether 
municipalities provide an optimal level of local public goods. The central point made in this 
paper instead is that the extent of house price capitalization itself may have important 
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economic implications. Specifically, house price capitalization may provide incentives to 
invest in the provision of local public goods, club goods or even private goods with positive 
externalities. Capitalization, or the lack thereof, may also have important unintended 
redistributive consequences and other unintended effects: they may offset the positive 
incentive effects of certain policy measures.  
Furthermore, the possibility that the extent of capitalization systematically varies across 
locations has important implications for various strands of the economic literature. Research 
in many areas makes the implicit assumption of uniform capitalization (i.e., local property 
values fully reflect the present discounted value of future benefits and costs). Such research 
includes urban quality-of-life comparisons (e.g., Blomquist et al. 1988; Gyourko and Tracy 
1991; Gyourko et al. 1999), capitalization studies of environmental amenities (e.g., Smith and 
Huang 1995; Bui and Mayer 2003), capitalization studies of school quality and spending (see 
Section 2.2)8, capitalization studies of taxes (see also Section 2.2), and capitalization studies 
of government subsidies or state aid (e.g., Barrow and Rouse 2004).  
The approach taken in these studies depends on demand factors alone and assumes either 
that demand for housing is perfectly elastic everywhere, so that the elasticity of the long-run 
housing supply curve is irrelevant and shifts in demand are thus fully capitalized everywhere 
(the situation depictured in Figure 1, Panel A) or that local demand curves are downward 
sloping but that the supply of undeveloped land is inelastic and similar across locations, so 
that shifts in demand are also fully capitalized everywhere (Figure 1, Panel B). If however 
local demand curves are downward sloping (somewhat inelastic) and the supply elasticity 
varies across locations, then the extent of capitalization will also vary across locations. This 
situation is illustrated in Figure 1, Panel C. To the extent that we are in a setting as depictured 
in Panel C, the conclusions of all the studies listed in the previous paragraph may be 
inaccurate. This is because house price capitalization estimates cannot be easily interpreted as 
a household’s willingness to pay for local amenities or local fiscal variables. This is often true 
in the US outside of coastal areas as well as in parts of Continental Europe and in the less 
urbanized areas of many developing countries.9 
 
                                                 
8 Studies that use a boundary discontinuity approach, such as Black (1999), only look at houses very close to 
attendance district boundaries where land supply might indeed be equally and completely inelastic. Cross 
sectional studies, however, normally present estimates based on much less disaggregated data and do not take 
into account differences in the land supply elasticity. The estimated coefficients in these studies may be biased. 
9 The long-run supply may be particularly elastic in Africa and parts of Asia where few cities have effective 
controls on land availability. The important exceptions in Asia are India (see Bertaud and Brueckner 2005) and 
China, where supply of land is quite strongly regulated and constrained (see Cheshire 2007). 
 13
Figure 1: The Role of Demand and Supply Price Elasticities 
  
The next two sub-sections discuss the factors that determine the elasticities of the local 
demand and supply curves respectively and thus help determine the extent to which house 
prices respond to changes in local demand. 
 
3.2 Theoretical considerations: Assumptions on the demand side 
In a world where households are homogenous and can relocate without any moving costs 
and locations are perfectly substitutable, the local demand for housing will be perfectly 
elastic. In such a setting a given exogenous demand shock should always be fully capitalized 
into house prices independent of the long-run supply price elasticity (at least as long as the 
supply curve is not perfectly elastic). Two important spatial equilibrium models – the Rosen-
Roback model (Rosen 1974; Roback 1982) and the open monocentric city model (see e.g., 
Brueckner 1987) – implicitly assume such perfectly elastic local housing demand. The crucial 
assumptions are that households all have the same preferences and can relocate without costs. 
If these two assumptions hold, even if places differ in their local attributes, local supply 
constraints on housing in a particular location that offers a particular amenity (e.g., access to a 
lake) do not only raise prices locally but in all locations that offer the scarce amenity (i.e., all 
locations that offer access to lakes). Local supply constraints should not matter at the local 
level; they should only matter in aggregate as they restrict the supply of a scarce amenity so 
raise the price of that amenity everywhere. This is because demand for housing in all 
locations that offer the scarce amenity is perfectly elastic and therefore the price of the 
amenity must be the same everywhere.  
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In reality places differ in their provision of local public services, in their local taxes and 
their amenities. Some of these local attributes are rather unique (e.g., a view on the Golden 
Gate Bridge) or are at least in short supply (e.g., top quality local public schools). Moreover, 
households have heterogeneous tastes, that is, they vary in their appreciation for differences in 
local attributes.10 Households with a strong preference for a certain local attribute (subject to 
income) are willing to pay more for that attribute than other households. This induces sorting 
of households with different preferences into different places so the preferences of the 
marginal homebuyer and the corresponding willingness-to-pay for certain amenities may 
differ across space. In such a world with heterogeneous tastes, the local housing demand 
curve becomes downward sloping. With each additional household entering a community, all 
else equal, the marginal homebuyer has an ever lower willingness to pay for living in the 
place. By implication, house prices cease to reflect the willingness to pay for local public 
services and amenities of inframarginal households.11 
Households – especially homeowners but also renters in public housing – also face very 
substantial relocation costs. This is another mechanism that can induce the local demand 
curve to become downward sloping (at least in the short- and medium-run). It is quite 
intuitive that with heterogeneity in relocation costs, the housing demand curve becomes 
downward sloping – even if all households have the same tastes. Krupka and Donaldson 
(2013) provide a formal treatment of this argument by altering the Rosen-Roback framework 
to allow for moving costs which vary among a city’s residents and businesses. In such a 
setting regional differences in rents and wages can no longer be interpreted as compensating. 
While in a world with heterogeneous housing costs amenities are still important for housing 
rents, the local housing supply becomes the main other factor determining regional rents. 
A special form of relocation costs or taste heterogeneity is ‘attachment to one’s home’: 
Households may differ in their willingness-to-pay for access to certain locations because of an 
attachment to their place of birth (see e.g. Mansoorian and Myers 1993; Krupka 2009). That 
is, households may have similar preferences for certain locations once they leave their home 
town (they have the same utility in the rest of the economy), however, their willingness-to-
pay for living in their own home town will always be greater (households derive idiosyncratic 
                                                 
10 See Bayer et al. (2007) who demonstrate that there is considerable heterogeneity in preferences for schools 
and neighbors, with households preferring to self-segregate on the basis of race and education. 
11 See for example Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) for an early discussion of this argument. For a more recent 
discussion and formal treatment of taste heterogeneity (and imperfect mobility) see Albouy (2011, section 5). 
Theoretical models with imperfect substitutability between locations generally assume heterogeneity in tastes for 
locations. See e.g. Gyourko et al. (2013), Aura and Davidoff (2008) or Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013). In such 
models, supply constraints may raise prices because they constrain the number of households, so that the 
marginal household has a higher willingness to pay for residing in the place. 
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benefits from this particular location). Gibbons et al. (2011) note in this context “…when 
people have different preferences over locations, even when they offer the same amenities, 
…[s]upply constraints in one location can make an amenity there look more expensive, 
because those with the strongest preferences for that location want to live in that location, and 
are prepared to pay more for any amenity in that location than other people. …” and “…the 
implication is that the price differentials between areas measure the value of these areas to the 
marginal household, which is not necessarily the average household in terms of preferences.” 
To what extent (differences in) local supply constraints matter is – in the end – an 
empirical question. It will depend on (i) the degree of substitutability of locations (how 
heterogeneous locations and preferences are), (ii) relocation costs (the share of the population 
that moves between labor markets in each period) and, as a special case; (iii) idiosyncratic 
benefits that some households derive from certain locations (e.g., their place of birth).  
Glaeser and Ward (2009) argued that housing demand may be pretty elastic across 
municipalities within a metro area and hence local supply constraints may not matter much at 
the very local level. They state that “[t]he same abundance of similar, small jurisdictions that 
makes Greater Boston a natural place to examine the impact of land use controls on new 
construction makes the area a much less natural place to examine the impact of land use 
controls on price. There are so many close substitutes for most towns that we would not 
expect restricting of housing supply in one town to raise prices in that town relative to another 
town with similar demographics and density levels. Restrictions on building in one suburban 
community should not raise prices in that community relative to another town with equivalent 
amenities, any more than restrictions on the production of Saudi Arabian crude will raise the 
price of Saudi Arabian crude relative to Venezuelan crude. Of course, Saudi Arabia’s quantity 
restrictions will still raise the global price of oil, but this cannot be seen by comparisons of 
prices across oil producers.”  
The analogy of oil and land is not unproblematic, however. Whereas Saudi Arabian and 
Venezuelan crude may indeed be perfect substitutes, the same is typically not the case for two 
parcels of land; even if these are located in neighboring municipalities. To begin with, not all 
metro areas are as homogenous as the Greater Boston area. Moreover, even in the Greater 
Boston area, say downtown Boston or Cambridge are poor substitutes for the less urbanized 
towns surrounding Boston. Hence, whilst land parcels in two neighboring towns in the outer 
ring of Greater Boston may indeed be close substitutes, this is not true for all places in Greater 
Boston. In fact Hilber and Mayer (2009) provide evidence that comparably less physically 
developed locations in Massachusetts have more elastic supply of housing and a smaller 
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extent of house price capitalization, compared to the more developed locations. Their results 
hold even if they confine their sample to the Greater Boston area only (although the effects 
are slightly less pronounced). In a similar vein, Lutz (2015) examines the effect of a large 
exogenous shift in property tax burdens induced by a 1999 school finance reform in the state 
of New Hampshire. His estimates suggest that, in most of the state, municipalities with a 
reduced tax burden experienced a large increase in residential construction. In the area of the 
state near Boston, the region’s primary urban center, however, the shock cleared through price 
adjustment. Lutz attributes these differing responses to differing housing supply elasticities. 
Both, the findings of Hilber and Mayer (2009) and of Lutz (2015) are suggestive that local 
demand in the Greater Boston area is not perfectly elastic.   
 
3.3 Theoretical considerations: Assumptions on the supply side 
In a world with downward sloping local demand curves, assumptions on the slope or 
elasticity of the local supply curve are crucial for the response of house prices to given 
demand shocks. Local long-run supply constraints are bound to affect the local supply price 
elasticity and, consequently, the ‘extent’ of capitalization of fiscal variables. In this sub-
section I explore the degree to which the extent of house price capitalization can be expected 
to vary across locations due to differences in geographical (or physical) supply constraints 
and/or due to differences in regulatory supply constraints.  
A number of empirical studies suggest that geographical supply constraints may affect 
the supply price elasticity and that therefore demand shocks should have a stronger impact on 
house prices in such constrained places. To begin with, McDonald and McMillen (2000) 
show for Suburban Chicago that residential development is greater in areas with a large share 
of agricultural land. Brasington (2002) documents, by splitting a sample into houses on the 
interior and the edge of the urban area, that capitalization is weaker towards the edge where 
housing supply-price elasticities and developer activity are greater. Hilber and Mayer (2009) 
use aerial survey and satellite land cover data to compute for each municipality in 
Massachusetts and for each school district in the contiguous US the share of already 
developed residential land to total developable land.12 Their findings strongly support the 
proposition that more physically constrained places have less elastic housing supply and a 
greater extent of house price capitalization of demand factors. Saiz (2010) provides further 
evidence for the US that geographical constraints affect the price elasticity of housing supply. 
                                                 
12 Hilber and Mayer (2009) consider land to be non-developable if it is classified as open water, perennial 
ice, barren, or wetland. Their main definition of ‘non-developable’ land also includes industrial land but their 
results are essentially unchanged if they drop industrial land from the list of non-developable uses. 
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His focus is on topography and the presence of water bodies (including Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans). Saiz measures the amount of developable land based on the presence of water bodies 
and high elevation, demonstrating that most metropolitan areas that are widely regarded as 
supply-inelastic are severely land-constrained by topography and water.  
A number of theoretical explanations exist that can rationalize the finding of a link 
between geographical or physical constraints on the one hand and the inelasticity of supply of 
housing on the other. To begin with, at the extreme, when a highly desirable place is fully 
built-up, it is quite intuitive why the supply of developable land is almost perfectly inelastic: 
existing physical structures, which are typically well-maintained in desirable places, can only 
be demolished and reconstructed at higher density at an extremely high cost.  
Most places have at least some developable land however. So the perhaps more relevant 
question is: Why should more developed locations have more inelastic supply and a greater 
extent of capitalization? The first argument is a purely mechanical one; mathematically, as 
long as the supply curve has a positive price intercept, even a linear curve generates a positive 
relationship between scarcity of developable land and the price inelasticity of supply.13 
A second argument is founded in the ‘endogenous zoning’ literature. Saiz (2010) argues 
that high house prices, induced by geographical constraints, spur homeowners to vote for 
tighter regulation (homevoter hypothesis). He documents that, all else equal, more 
geographically constrained places have higher house prices and that these geographical 
constraints correlated positively and strongly with regulatory barriers to development and that 
both types of constraints negatively affect the elasticity of housing supply.  
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) consider land use restrictions as political outcomes 
determined not only by voting but also by lobbying and considering also the role of landlords 
and owners of undeveloped land. They argue that owners of developed land – homeowners 
and landlords – have an incentive to limit new housing supply to protect the value of their 
assets, whereas owners of undeveloped land have an interest in flexible zoning (to keep 
development costs low). Both groups can potentially influence the political process through 
voting and lobbying. Hence, to the extent that the tightness of land use regulation is indeed 
the outcome of a political process, new housing supply ought to be more price-inelastic in 
more developed locations where owners of developed land are more numerous and, hence, 
                                                 
13 The assumption of a positive price intercept is not restrictive. It merely implies that the present value of 
future land rents from farming is greater than zero. In locations where land is ‘developable’ (i.e., the land is not 
wetland or desert land) this is almost certainly the case. 
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arguably politically more influential (influential landowner hypothesis14). This reasoning also 
provides an explanation for why highly desirable areas (such as San Francisco or New York 
City) tend to be more tightly regulated: Desirable locations are more developed and, 
consequently, more regulated. This explanation reinforces the argument made for fully built-
up places: To the extent that these places are also the most regulatory constrained, regulatory 
costs add to the already excessive demolition and reconstruction costs when redeveloping 
existing sites in those places.15  
A final argument can be derived from the real options literature, which assumes that land 
redevelopment is costly and developable open land therefore has an option value (see e.g., 
Titman 1985; Capozza and Helsley 1990; Capozza and Li 1994; Novy-Marx 2007). In such a 
setting, when a place becomes increasingly built-up, the incremental opportunity cost of 
adding an extra housing unit – the real option – increases, at some point, likely exponentially, 
implying inelastic supply of new housing. 
A number of recent studies, conducted in the US, document that tight land use regulation 
reduces the housing supply price elasticity (e.g., Mayer and Somerville 2000; Harter-Dreiman 
2004; Green et al. 2005; Quigley and Raphael 2005; Saiz 2010) whilst raising price levels 
(e.g., Malpezzi 1996; Glaeser and Gyourko 2003; Glaeser et al. 2005a and b; Hwang and 
Quigley 2006; Quigley and Raphael 2005; Saks 2008). Mayer and Somerville (2000) find that 
metropolitan areas with more extensive regulation can have up to 45 percent fewer starts and 
price elasticities that are more than 20 percent lower than those in less regulated markets. 
Glaeser et al. (2005 a and b) conjecture that tight land use controls may be largely to blame 
for the exorbitant rise in housing prices in the US during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Whereas the studies discussed above focus on house prices, a small recent literature in the 
U.S. has explored the impact of supply price elasiticies – as measured by Saiz (2010) using 
                                                 
14 The influential landowner hypothesis encompasses the voting mechanism (i.e., the homevoter hypothesis) 
but also emphasizes the possibility that political outcomes are determined by lobbying. That is, owners of 
undeveloped land and absentee landlords may be able to influence the political process and the decision of 
planning boards even though they may not be able to directly elect the members of the (local) planning boards. 
The fact that the most regulatory constrained  metro areas (New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles) have 
(among the) lowest homeownership rates in the country is at least indicative that ‘homevoting’ alone may not 
explain across metro area differences in regulatory restrictiveness. Numerous studies provide empirical support 
for this theoretical argument. Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) provide extensive evidence at US metro area 
level that suggests that the degree of physical development (local land scarcity) in a metro area may have a 
causal positive effect on the overall regulatory restrictiveness of that metro area. Various other studies provide 
additional support. For example, Rudel (1989) demonstrates that municipalities in Connecticut adopted land use 
laws later if they were at a greater distance to New York City and had a greater share of farmland. Increases in 
restrictiveness occurred in those places that experienced the largest declines in farming during the 1960s. Fischel 
(2004) documents that land use regulations typically originated in the centers of large cities and then spread to 
the surrounding suburbs and towns. Lastly, Glaeser et al. (2005a) find a very high “regulatory tax” for 
Manhattan condominiums and much lower values for the entire metro area. 
15 In the US, typically, subdivision of existing developed parcels requires a zoning ordinance waiver. 
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variation in both regulatory and geographical constraints – on land values. Consistent with the 
literature discussed above, Davis and Palumbo (2008) find that land values are more volatile 
in metro areas with inelastic supply. Interestingly, Kuminoff and Pope (2012), who study land 
price volatility during the great boom and bust between 1998 and 2009, document the 
opposite pattern within metro areas: neighborhoods at the urban fringe experienced the most 
volatility in land values. Kuminoff and Pope speculate that this may be because the relaxation 
of credit constraints was particularly important for lower income households, allowing them 
to purchase houses at the fringe of the suburbs. In a setting with myopic agents or unrealistic 
expectations (irrational exuberance) and short-term construction lags, this might explain the 
higher land price volatility at the fringe. 
Two recent studies, discussed above, suggest that the two types of supply constraints – 
regulatory and geographical – can be expected to be interlinked. Whilst Saiz (2010) suggests 
that the undevelopable area in an MSA is strongly positively associated with regulatory 
constraints, Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) provide evidence indicative of a causal effect 
running from share developed developable land to regulatory restrictiveness.  
Hilber and Vermeulen (forthcoming) exploit a unique panel dataset of English local 
authorities16 and use an IV-approach to jointly identify the independent causal effects of three 
different types of local supply constraints (all measured at the local authority-level): (i) 
regulatory constraints (proxied by residential refusal rates), (ii) scarcity of developable land 
(proxied by the share of already developed land relative to all developable land, based on geo-
coded satellite land cover data) and (iii) topography-induced constraints (proxied by elevation 
ranges and measures of ruggedness). Hilber and Vermeulen find that house prices react more 
strongly to labor demand shocks in more regulatory and in more physically constrained local 
authorities. The effect of regulatory constraints is strong across most of England (in line with 
the stylized fact that the British planning system is very restrictive by world standards), 
whereas the effect of constraints due to scarcity of developable land is confined to highly 
urbanized areas – mainly the Greater London Area.17 Uneven topography has a quantitatively 
less meaningful impact. Finally, they find that the effects of supply constraints are greater 
during boom than during bust periods. Overall, Hilber and Vermeulen’s findings for England 
                                                 
16 Whilst the typical English local authority – with an average of around 144,000 residents – is significantly 
larger than an average sized American municipality, it is significantly smaller than the larger U.S. metro areas. 
17 Interestingly, this finding is consistent with the combined results in Hilber and Mayer (2009) and Lutz 
(2015). While land availability does not have a significant impact on the housing supply elasticity in New 
Hampshire where land for development is abundantly available in most parts of the state. In much denser 
neighboring Massachusetts – the Commonwealth is the third densest US state – land availability does influence 
the housing supply elasticity.  
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are consistent with the proposition that both types of constraints – regulatory and 
geographical constraints – reduce the long-term responsiveness of new construction to prices. 
Put differently: the extent of house price capitalization is greater in places that are constrained 
by regulatory restrictions and by physical barriers to residential development. Both types of 
constraints may thus serve as measures that allow researchers to identify the effects of house 
price capitalization on the provision of public goods, club goods and private goods. 
 
4 Capitalization and incentives to invest: A first step towards a ‘taxonomy’ 
In this section I explore how house price capitalization induced incentives in supply 
constrained locations may provide a mechanism – besides other factors such as altruism or 
reciprocal behavior – to induce homeowners and, in particular, mobile homeowners to invest 
in local public goods, club goods, or even private goods with positive externalities (such as 
exterior home improvements). The broader aim is to develop a ‘taxonomy’ of how house 
price capitalization and homeownership may affect the provision of these different types of 
goods. As I will outline below, the underlying mechanisms differ for different types of goods 
and institutional settings. I also review the scant empirical evidence that tests the theoretical 
predictions. 
 
4.1 Local public goods: The case of collective investments in public schools  
A few theoretical studies have pointed out that the presence of house value capitalization 
may induce homeowners to take into account preferences of eventual buyers of their house 
when voting on durable local public goods (e.g., Wildasin 1979; Sonstelie and Portney 1980; 
Brueckner and Joo 1991). The theoretical models of Wildasin (1979) and Sonstelie and 
Portney (1980) both illustrate that, all else equal, (mobile) voters prefer public good levels 
that maximize their house values. If the public good level is sub-optimal from the viewpoint 
of local residents they have the option to sell their house and move to another local 
jurisdiction, in which the fiscal package better matches their preferences. Brueckner and Joo 
(1991) consider the decision of imperfectly mobile voters in the presence of house price 
capitalization. Their model demonstrates that a voter’s ideal public spending level reflects a 
blend of his or her own preferences for local public goods and those of the eventual 
homebuyer. In a world with imperfect mobility, the voter no longer solely seeks to maximize 
the house value, although house value maximization considerations become more important, 
the shorter the expected duration in the local jurisdiction. Their model also suggests that 
liquidity constrained households are more likely to behave like property value maximizers 
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than unconstrained households. Fischel (2001a/b) described homeowners as “homevoters” 
whose voting and local political activities are guided by their concerns about home values.  
A few empirical papers provide support for this view. To begin with, Brunner et al. 
(2001) examine voter behavior in a California school voucher initiative. Their finding of a 
negative correlation between the premium paid for housing and support for the school choice 
initiative suggests that homevoters who feared that their property values may be adversely 
affected, voted against the proposal. In a follow up study, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003), using 
a survey of potential voters on California’s school voucher initiative,  provide evidence 
consistent with the view that homeowners vote to protect their property values: homeowners 
without school children were significantly more likely to vote for the voucher if they lived in 
neighborhoods with inferior schools (where vouchers are expected to increase property 
values) than if they lived in neighborhoods with superior schools (where vouchers likely 
decrease property values). Dehring et al. (2008) propose that homeowners vote in favor of 
public projects they perceive increase house values and against those that do not. Using 
information from pre-referendum events and the referendum itself on a proposed publicly 
subsidized NFL stadium in Arlington, TX, they provide support for the homevoter hypothesis 
in the sense that local residents voted in favor of the stadium if the project was likely to 
increase their house values. In a similar vein, Ahlfeldt (2011) examines support for a major 
urban development project in Berlin, albeit, in an environment of very low owner-occupancy, 
that is, in an area where the median voter is a renter. Consistent with the findings of the 
previous studies, Ahlfeldt’s findings suggest that (renter-)residents oppose public projects 
they associate to increases in the local cost of living.  
Hilber and Mayer (2009) developed a simple formal framework to examine the impact of 
house price capitalization on the decision of local voters whether to support a durable increase 
in local public school spending. The investment entails a commitment to increase school 
spending, financed via local taxes, over a number of periods. Hence, the benefit in form of 
better school quality and the tax cost accrue in the future, as well as in the present period. In 
this setting, whether the investment occurs depends on the payoff of the median voter.  
Consider the (plausible) case where (a) the investment generates a positive net benefit for 
households with children in each period, (b) the marginal homebuyer has children and (c) 
some portion of the net benefit is capitalized into house prices (positive extent of 
capitalization). In this setting, all else equal, homeowners will always be more likely than 
renters to vote in favor of the investment. Moreover, existing homeowners without children 
(including the elderly) support the investment, as long as their expected duration in the 
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property is short enough. The model further predicts that these households should be sensitive 
to the extent of capitalization. The simple framework – which is outlined in more detail in 
Hilber and Mayer (2009) – makes four empirically testable predictions for the provision of 
local public goods in a system where local residents vote on local public good provision 
(either directly or indirectly). In general terms, the predictions can be summarized as follows: 
 
Prediction 1: An investment in a durable local public good (that has a positive net 
benefit from the perspective of the marginal homebuyer) will be greater/more likely 
in more supply constrained locations, where the expected ‘extent of capitalization’ of 
given demand shifts is greater.18 
Prediction 2: The positive link between the ‘rigidity of supply constraints’ and 
investments in durable local public goods should only exist in locations where the 
median resident is a homeowner. 
Prediction 3: The interaction between measures of the ‘rigidity of supply constraints’ 
and a ‘high share of households with a relatively short expected duration in their 
property’ should be positive. (Applied to the case of local public schools in the US 
institutional setting; the elderly, who have a comparably shorter expected time 
horizon in their property, can be expected to be more willing to support school 
spending in districts where the extent of capitalization is high.) 
Prediction 4: The positive relationship between ‘share of households with a short 
expected duration’ and ‘rigidity of supply constraints’ should be strongest for the 
group of residents with the shortest expected duration. 
 
In their empirical work Hilber and Mayer (2009) identify a proxy for the extent of house 
price capitalization – the supply of land available for new development – and show that towns 
in Massachusetts with little undeveloped land have larger changes in house prices in response 
to a plausibly exogenous spending shock.  Towns with little available land also spend more on 
schools.  They then extend these results using data from school districts in 46 US states, 
showing that per pupil spending is positively related to the percentage of developed land 
                                                 
18 Hilber and Mayer’s (2009) interpretation of this prediction is that local supply constraints determine the 
extent of capitalization of demand factors: If the local demand curve is downward sloping – as discussed in 
Section 3.2 – the rigidity of local supply constraints should determine the extent of capitalization. It is worth 
noting, however, that another mechanism may bring about the same empirical finding: In school districts with 
elastic supply, investment in a local public school may attract many new families with school-aged children. 
These additional children use up resources. The newcomer’s children may also be difficult and costly to 
integrate. This in turn may ‘dilute’ the investment-induced school quality and, consequently, house prices may 
increase less than in the absence of the newcomers. Hence, even if the observed (diminished) school quality were 
fully capitalized, local supply constraints would still matter for ‘incentives to invest’. The idea of a ‘dilution 
effect’ is discussed in the next sub-section in the context of individual social capital investment. 
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(Prediction 1). This positive correlation persists only in districts where the median resident is 
a homeowner (Prediction 2) and is stronger in districts with more elderly residents who do not 
use school services and have a shorter expected duration in their home (Prediction 3).  
Finally, they find that these positive interaction effects are strongest for the group of older 
elderly with the shortest expected duration in their property (Prediction 4). Hence, their 
findings support theoretical models in which capitalization encourages the provision of 
durable local public goods (and provide an explanation for why some elderly support local 
school spending). 
 
4.2 Club goods: The case of individual investments in local social capital19 
A number of empirical studies document a positive link between homeownership and 
individual investment in social capital and civic efforts (e.g., Rossi and Weber 1996; 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999; Hoff and Sen 2005).20 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) provide 
evidence that is suggestive of a causal effect from the former onto the latter. Capitalization of 
community quality into house prices may be a plausible mechanism explaining the link. In 
fact, Glaeser and DiPasquale (1999) argue that homeowners are “better citizens” because 
homeownership creates barriers to mobility and gives individuals an incentive to invest in 
local amenities and social capital since community quality is capitalized into property values. 
Coulson et al. (2003a and 2003b) and Coulson and Li (2013) provide direct evidence that 
external benefits associated with higher neighborhood homeownership rates are capitalized 
into higher housing prices.21 However alternative mechanisms such as reciprocal behavior22 
could potentially also explain a positive link between homeownership and social capital (see 
Hilber 2010 for a discussion of alternative explanations). 
It is tempting to conclude that the predictions outlined above for the case of public 
investment in local public schools (or other durable local public goods) should equally apply 
to the case of private investment in social capital/social capital induced neighborhood clubs 
(such as neighborhood watch groups). Yet, the two types of investment differ crucially from 
each other. In the former setting the public vote is binding for all residents and direct benefits 
accrue only to a minority of residents (households with children). Yet, all residents bear the 
direct tax costs. In the latter setting each resident makes an individual investment decision 
                                                 
19 This Section draws heavily on Hilber (2010). 
20 See Dietz and Haurin (2004) for a review of the wider literature on the micro-level economic and social 
consequences of homeownership. 
21 In contrast to the former studies, the latter exploits the panel nature of the American Housing Survey data 
to account for unobservable neighborhood and housing heterogeneity. 
22 For an exposition of the mechanism of reciprocal behaviour see for example Helsley and Strange (2004). 
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that only has private cost implications. As long as investors can largely exclude those who do 
not invest from access to social capital induced benefits, there will be a link between 
investment and direct benefits. Nevertheless, homeowners can in principle free ride on other 
neighbors’ investments by not investing and selling their property. (In the case of local public 
schools, either nobody or all residents invest.) This implies that in the case of neighborhood 
specific social capital, nobody may initially have an incentive to invest, unless some 
“mechanism” prevents free riding. This mechanism may be the existence of housing 
transaction costs: selling a property only to free ride on other neighbors’ investments is not an 
attractive option if the transaction costs exceed the benefits derived from social capital. 
Transaction costs of selling a house – even when excluding any other relocation costs – are 
typically quite high. For example, Haurin and Gill (2002) estimate these transaction costs in 
the U.S. as the sum of 3% of the house value and 4% of total household earning.  
In a world with high transaction costs the question then becomes whether the 
homeowner’s long-term benefits derived from social capital exceed the costs. The answer to 
this question crucially depends on the elasticity of new local housing supply. Consider a 
neighborhood where renters can relocate freely but transaction costs make existing 
homeowners immobile. In such a setting homeowners have greater incentives to invest in 
social capital compared to renters as long as the long-term net benefits exceed the initial 
investment costs and investors can, for the most part, exclude non-investors from access to 
social capital induced club goods. This is because homeowners can internalize the long-term 
net benefits from their investments, while renters are at least partially deprived of those net 
benefits (landlords can pocket proceeds by increasing rents).  
In this setting, the elasticity of new housing supply is critical for social capital investment 
because, all else equal, it affects the inflow of newcomers and thereby determines the 
homeowners’ long-term net benefits from social capital. In a built-up neighborhood with 
inelastic supply of developable land, initial investors in social capital are largely protected 
from inflows of newcomers that could dilute the long-run net benefit from that social capital. 
Dilution may occur either as a consequence of an increase in social capital maintenance costs 
or due to congestion effects on the consumption side.  
In contrast, in a little developed neighborhood with elastic supply, newly accumulated 
social capital will steer landowners to develop new housing units as long as the price exceeds 
the marginal (opportunity) cost of conversion. In the long-run, the net benefit from social 
capital is diluted to an extent that the marginal newcomer’s net benefit and the corresponding 
house price premium become very small. It is quite intuitive that in such a setting nobody has 
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an incentive to make an investment in neighborhood specific social capital in the first place. 
The above theoretical considerations imply two general, empirically testable, predictions: 
 
Prediction 5: The positive link between individual homeownership and individual 
investment in local club goods (e.g., neighborhood specific social capital investment) 
should be stronger, all else equal, in more supply constrained locations. 
Prediction 6: Newcomers should socially interact with other neighbors after a brief 
period (to get access to the club goods) and there should not be much increase in the 
intensity as the duration in the neighborhood increases. 
 
The expected duration in the property should have a positive effect on individual 
investment in neighborhood specific social capital, unlike in the case of a durable increase in 
local public school spending. This is because the accumulated benefits derived from social 
capital increase with the expected length of stay, while the large initial burden (in the form of 
efforts needed to generate trust and friendship among involved club members) accrues even if 
the residents only have a short duration. Moreover, the benefits associated with the sale of a 
property at the time of exit accrue independent of whether or not a homeowner bears the 
investment costs. Hence, a longer expected duration should increase the likelihood that the 
investment has a positive payoff. The following should hold: 
 
Prediction 7: Individual investment in local club goods (such as neighborhood-specific 
social capital) should be positively related to the expected time until the next move. 
 
Moreover, unlike in the case of local public schools, homeowners with a short expected 
duration in the property should not react sensitively to the extent of capitalization. They will 
always be better off not investing, independent of the extent of capitalization.  
Hilber (2010) uses an IV-approach and data from the Social Capital Community 
Benchmark Survey to document that the positive link between homeownership and individual 
social capital investment is indeed largely confined to more built-up neighborhoods with more 
inelastic supply of new housing (Prediction 5). The empirical findings provide support for the 
proposition that in these localities supply constraints, which ensure that initial social capital 
investments increase house values, provide additional incentives for homeowners to invest in 
social capital. Hilber (2010) also provides evidence supporting Predictions 6 and 7. 
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5 Unintended redistribution and other unintended effects of 
 capitalization 
5.1 Redistributive effects: Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence 
The proposition that government policies are capitalized into land values and thereby can 
have unintended redistributive consequences goes back all the way to David Ricardo (1817) 
who studied the Corn Laws passed in England during the first decade of the 19th century. 
Ricardo argued that a tax on imported corn to raise its price and thereby protect British 
farmers, would have the effect of raising the rent of wheat land (and hence its value) until the 
benefits to the farmer renting the land are effectively wiped out. The true beneficiaries of the 
policy would be the landlords who own the land. 
In a residential (and more modern) context, several authors have argued theoretically that 
location-based aid (as opposed to grants to poor individuals) can have adverse consequences, 
since poor residents are typically renters who will be forced to pay higher rents if the transfers 
are capitalized into higher house prices (e.g., Hamilton 1976b and Wyckoff 1995). Wyckoff 
(1995) developed a simple model with two communities and three income groups to 
demonstrate that in the case of an urban area in which the central city is small relative to the 
entire metro area, the welfare effect of intergovernmental aid (such as education aid) on poor 
voters should be expected to be completely offset by higher housing costs. In fact, the 
capitalization of any place based government policy potentially has important – often 
unintended – distributional consequences. A finding of substantial or full capitalization may 
jeopardize any distributional objectives that governed the design of policies and government 
programs aimed to help disadvantaged groups.  
On the empirical side, a few studies investigated econometrically whether farm subsidies 
are capitalized into land values. For example, Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné (1992) find a 
strong relationship between producer subsidy equivalents and land values in six regions in the 
US, Canada, and France. Clark et al. (1993) on the other hand, using data for the region of 
Saskatchewan in Canada, find only weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that short-term 
subsidies are capitalized into land values, possibly because farmland in Saskatchewan is 
supplied quite elastically.  
More recently, a few studies have investigated the distributional consequences of 
geographically-targeted policies. Hanson (2009) explored the impact of the federal 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) program, a set of tax incentives targeted to areas of select cities. 
Hanson’s most rigorous (IV) estimates suggest that the EZ program had a large effect on 
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property values implying that geographically-targeted tax incentives may mainly benefit 
landowners. Hilber et al. (2011) explore the impact of central government grants on local 
house prices in England. Their findings indicate substantial to full capitalization. Furthermore 
they find that house prices respond somewhat more strongly in locations in which new 
construction is constrained by geographical barriers (i.e., in rugged terrain). This suggests that 
increases in grants to a local authority may mainly benefit the typically better off property 
owners (homeowners and absentee landlords) in that local authority. Or put differently: any 
adjustments in the distribution of grants over local authorities would boil down to 
redistribution of resources between property owners in gaining and losing local authorities 
without making private renters any better off.23  
 
5.2 Other unintended effects: Offsetting of policy induced incentives 
House price capitalization of government programs and policies does not only have 
unintended distributional consequences but may also offset intended policy induced 
incentives. A prime example to illustrate these perverse effects is the home mortgage interest 
deduction (MID). The aim of the MID is to create incentives to become a homeowner and buy 
more housing. Various researchers have pointed out that the MID is a poor instrument for 
encouraging homeownership as it benefits mainly higher income households, who are almost 
always homeowners anyway (see e.g., Glaeser and Shapiro 2003). The capitalization of the 
MID into house prices casts an even more damning light on the MID. Hilber and Turner 
(2014) examine the impact of the combined U.S. state and federal mortgage interest deduction 
(MID) on homeownership attainment.  They find that capitalization of the MID into house 
prices offsets the positive effect on homeownership: The MID only boosts homeownership 
attainment of higher income households in less tightly regulated housing markets.  In more 
restrictive places – typically larger coastal cities – an adverse effect exists. Arguably this is 
because in supply constrained metro areas the MID increases housing demand and, 
consequently, the price of owner-occupied housing relative to the price of rental housing (the 
reservation price). Would-be homeowners of course also benefit from the subsidy, so, all else 
equal to the extent that the subsidy is fully capitalized they should be neither better nor worse 
off. However, the MID – via increasing the price of owner-occupied housing – also increases 
the costs associated with the transaction of owner-occupied housing, as the latter is roughly 
proportional to house values (see Haurin and Gill 2002). This matters a lot to mobile 
                                                 
23 Grant increases may benefit renters in the social sector to the extent that their rents are detached from 
market rents.  
 28
(typically younger and better educated) residents, including to first time buyers. Some of 
these mobile households – ‘the marginal owner-occupiers’ – who preferred to own prior to an 
increase in the MID, may prefer to rent after an increase. In fact, this theoretical explanation 
may explain the finding by Bourassa and Min (2008) that the MID has a negative impact on 
homeownership attainment of the young. In a similar vein, the capitalization of the MID into 
higher house prices reduces the likelihood of credit constrained households to be able to 
qualify for a mortgage. That is, an MID induced increase in house prices will cause down-
payment constraints to become binding for certain ‘marginal households’ with respect to the 
housing tenure decision, forcing previously ‘marginal owner-occupiers’ to rent instead. 
 
6 Conclusions and Scope for Future Research 
This paper has two main objectives: (i) Outline the relevant strands of the literature on 
house price capitalization and its economic impacts and (ii) indicate possible directions for 
fertile future research. To advance the first objective, I have synthesized an emerging 
literature that explores the conditions under which public and private investments at the local 
and neighborhood level and intergovernmental transfers to local jurisdictions are capitalized 
into house prices and the broader implications of such capitalization. Theoretical 
considerations and recent empirical evidence suggest that house price capitalization is much 
more pronounced in locations with strict regulatory and geographical supply constraints. The 
effect of local scarcity of developable land on the extent of capitalization appears to be very 
non-linear, being largely confined to the most built-up areas. Ruggedness or steep slopes 
matter too but, again, the effects on capitalization appear to be confined only to quite steep 
slopes. The impact of regulatory constraints depends on the country specific institutional 
settings. For example, in the US the impact of regulatory constraints on the extent of 
capitalization varies enormously across metro areas, with capitalization effects being mainly 
confined to the more desirable coastal areas. The British planning system, in contrast, imposes 
constraints on the supply of space across the country, implying significant capitalization even 
in more remote places.  
Only a few empirical studies have so far tested whether varying degrees of house price 
capitalization generate different incentive effects. The scant empirical evidence for the US 
suggests that (i) such incentive effects do exist and (ii) are mainly confined to more supply 
constrained locations. This has important implications for the provision of local public goods 
and club goods as it suggests that the ‘capitalization induced’ provision of such goods may be 
greater in more supply constrained places.  
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The theoretical and empirical research discussed in this paper also has important 
consequences for redistribution and the assessment of place based policies at various levels of 
government (federal/central, state/regional, and local). The empirical findings discussed in the 
paper are strongly suggestive that capitalization effects – which are habitually ignored by 
policy makers – have important adverse consequences for a wide range of policies such as 
intergovernmental aid or the mortgage interest deduction. While the direct effect of 
intergovernmental aid to disadvantaged places is positive (i.e., considered in isolation making 
local residents better off), there is also typically an ignored hidden effect, namely, that better 
local public services or lower taxes are capitalized into property prices, so, effectively, the aid 
may mainly benefit typically better off homeowners and (often absentee) landlords who rent 
out their properties to typically lower income renters. These renters benefit from better local 
public services. However, they often do not benefit much from lower taxes, and, most 
importantly, they have to pay higher rents, reflecting the increased desirability of the 
receiving jurisdiction, so on balance they may be no better off or even worse off than without 
intergovernmental aid. Of course, in locations where such aid is not capitalized, the 
redistribution effects are more progressive. Overall, the empirical findings imply that policies 
with a redistributive aim might be much more effective if they “helped people rather than 
places”. House price capitalization of government programs and policies have a particularly 
damaging effect in places with inelastic supply of housing, that is, in geographically 
constrained places (such as San Francisco or Los Angeles) as well as in locations that are 
confronted with tight land use planning (e.g., New York City, San Francisco or Los Angeles; 
large parts of the UK and in particular the South East of England). Intergovernmental aid to 
poor inner city places may be a particularly poor tool to help disadvantaged people as the aid 
– due to capitalization effects – may make the disadvantaged quite possibly worse off.  
Similarly, house price capitalization effects may offset the intended incentive effects of 
certain policies. For example, the explicit aim of the mortgage interest deduction (MID) in 
most countries is to increase homeownership attainment. However, empirical findings for the 
US at least suggest that the MID has an overall negligible effect on homeownership 
attainment and has a negative effect in more supply constrained locations, where 
capitalization effects are greater. 
The research summarized in this paper is by no means conclusive. I have emphasized the 
importance of regulatory and geographical supply constraints in determining the ‘extent of 
capitalization’ and summarized the tentative empirical evidence. However, other factors 
besides supply constraints may be important too. In particular the role of household mobility, 
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and lack thereof, could be further explored in future empirical work. Empirical evidence on 
the incentive effects of capitalization is still quite limited. On the theoretical side, this article 
only provides a very tentative first step towards a ‘taxonomy’ of the incentive effects of house 
price capitalization. The ‘taxonomy’ sketched in this paper is very incomplete. For example, 
little is known whether capitalization effects can be expected to encourage the provision of 
largely private goods with positive externalities (e.g., beautiful private gardens). Empirical 
evidence is also limited.24 
While some researchers have argued that house price capitalization may provide a 
mechanism so that present residents (or present generations) internalize the well-being of 
future residents (future generations) (e.g., Conley and Rangel 2001, Glaeser 1996, and Oates 
and Schwab 1988 and 1996); there is little direct empirical evidence to date that capitalization 
provides inter-temporal and/or inter-generational incentive effects. Such effects may be 
largely confined to the local level, so may not be very helpful to tackle important 
environmental problems at regional, country-wide, or global scale. More research, both on the 
theoretical and empirical side, may help to develop a better understanding on whether (and 
under what conditions) capitalization may provide an incentive mechanism in an 
intergenerational sense. Finally, this paper has summarized recent evidence on the 
redistributive and policy implications of capitalization of central government grants in 
England and the MID in the US. Capitalization effects are of course not confined to these two 
policies but are potentially present in all policies that target places. Future research could 
focus on these other policies. The ‘house price capitalization research’ certainly provides 
highly fertile ground for future research. 
                                                 
24 One of the very few studies looking at private investments is the work by Galster (1983) who suggested 
that due to moral hazard problems tenants treat their units less carefully than homeowners. 
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